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court on April 2 attended by various luminaries in the judicial and political branches of the United States. The
somewhat tongue-in-cheek title of this essay is intended to suggest an important idea about the court today:
with increased visibility, significance, and impact have come consequences, some desirable, some not. This
essay undertook a brief review of how the court got where it is, and a look at what these consequences may be.
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FOREWORD
THE PRICE OF POPULARITY: THE COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
2007
HONORABLE S. JAY PLAGER∗
This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The anniversary was
acknowledged with appropriate ceremony, including an en banc
session of the court on April 2 attended by various luminaries in the
judicial and political branches of the United States. The somewhat
tongue-in-cheek title of this essay is intended to suggest an important
idea about the court today: with increased visibility, significance, and
impact have come consequences, some desirable, some not. This
essay will undertake a brief review of how the court got where it is,
and a look at what these consequences may be.
I.
In previous years judges of the court have authored forewords to
this annual review of the Circuit’s work. In 1999, now Chief Judge
Paul Michel noted the changing place of the court in the judicial
pantheon, and wrote about how the court must evolve to meet the
1
challenges ahead. As he put it, “[o]ne might say that the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has finally, or increasingly, been
2
‘discovered.’” A few years later, then Chief Judge Haldane Robert
∗
Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
I thank my law clerk, Lynne Pettigrew, for her assistance with this Foreword.
1. Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the
Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (1999).
2. Id. at 1181.
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Mayer reflected on the twentieth anniversary of the court, and
observed that “[t]he Federal Circuit today is, literally, a different
3
court from the one that existed twenty years ago.” He commented
on some of the changes in the court from the viewpoint of its
personnel, its practices, and its jurisprudence. He concluded his
remarks with the statement that “[i]t is appropriate to pause and
glance back. But it is the future that should command our
4
attention.”
Judge Richard Linn in his 2004 essay for the American University
5
Law Review turned his attention to the future.
He looked at
published statistics about the distribution of patent cases among the
trial courts and the challenge that the trial courts are presented with
because of the limited opportunities they have to develop expertise in
6
these technically and legally complex cases. He suggested ways in
which, in the future, the Federal Circuit might play a role within the
federal judiciary in educating and, as appropriate, assisting the
district courts in the handling of the patent cases that come before
7
them.
A year later, Judge Pauline Newman stepped back and looked at
the Circuit as “a court of commerce, industry, and governmental
obligation . . . the purpose [of which] was to reinvigorate the nation’s
industrial strength and technologic leadership, with the assistance of
8
a revived and effective patent system.” She concluded that “[t]he
formation and early decisions of the Federal Circuit produced a
resurgence in commercial activity and in scientific and technologic
creativity. Although changes in the law are today less dramatic, a
well-wrought jurisprudence continues to evolve to meet new
9
technologies, to answer new questions.”
This well-wrought
jurisprudence was the subject of last year’s extensive review by Judge
Arthur Gajarsa and Lawrence Cogswell of the court’s recent

3. Haldane Robert Mayer, Reflections on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 761, 761 (2003).
4. Id. at 769.
5. Richard Linn, The Future Role of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit Now That It Has Turned 21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 736 (2004) (citing S. Jay
Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy
and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 821
(2005).
9. Id. at 827.
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jurisprudence and the treatment it has received at the hands of the
10
Supreme Court.
From these reviews of the court’s business it is safe to say that the
court is now a staple part of the nation’s judicial establishment.
When the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 creating the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was signed
twenty-five years ago, it was understood that this newest of the circuit
11
courts was something of an experiment. The new court had two
characteristics that differentiated it from its sister circuits. One was
that its jurisdiction was to be based entirely on subject matter, not
geography. The other was that in the subject matter areas that were
assigned to it, the court would have exclusive jurisdiction, that is, no
12
other circuit court would hear appeals in those subject matter areas.
The effect of assigning specified areas to a single court of appeals is
to provide nationwide uniformity in those areas, thus making the
designated court the final arbiter of the applicable law, subject only
to Supreme Court review. Since much of Supreme Court review
results from the need to settle differences between the several circuit
courts of appeals, the consequence of a court having exclusive
jurisdiction is that the decisions of the Federal Circuit in its subject
matter areas will be the primary method for resolving disputes under
13
the applicable law, and this has proven to be the case.
One consequence of the way in which the court’s jurisdiction is
structured has led to a misunderstanding about the court. Those
who do not recognize the full scope of the court’s jurisdictional
responsibilities will sometimes refer to the court as “specialized”
(usually undefined). Though specialized courts have a place in the
judicial hierarchy, it is understood that the upper echelon of
appellate courts are generalist courts and therefore avoid the
assumed disadvantages of narrow vision and capture to which
specialized courts are supposedly subject.

10. Arthur J. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, The Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821 (2006).
11. See S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the
Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L.
REV. 853 (1990).
12. Plager, supra note 11, at 854. But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (holding that the Federal Circuit’s exclusive
jurisdiction in patent cases is limited to cases in which the patent issue arises in a
complaint).
13. Though the Supreme Court is not reluctant to supervise the work of the
Federal Circuit, see discussion infra, of the approximately 3500 cases decided on the
merits in the last five years by the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in only fifteen cases.
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A court could be considered specialized, with whatever inherent
limitations such a label may suggest, either in terms of its singular
subject matter jurisdiction or the uniformity of background and
training of the judges who make up the court, or both. In neither
respect is the Federal Circuit “specialized.” The subject matter
jurisdiction of the court is broad and diverse, as this annual review
14
demonstrates.
The judges who make up the court are equally
15
Whatever may be the relevant differences between
diverse.
specialized and generalized courts, they have little relevance to the
16
Federal Circuit and its work.
II.
The effect of the dramatic changes in the visibility and impact of
the Federal Circuit since its creation can be seen in the heightened
scrutiny the court’s output has received in recent years. Criticism can
be healthy, and can serve as a corrective; the Circuit is receiving its
share of criticism, directed at the court as an institution as well as at
specific cases and decisional areas. The academic community, which
for the longest time had little interest in the areas within the court’s
purview, now produces prodigious quantities of commentary, some of
the traditional doctrinal type, some of a more creative bent based on
17
empirical work, some laudatory, some not.
14. In addition to intellectual property issues, which make up approximately a
third of its case load, the court’s jurisdiction includes international trade cases,
contract suits against the government on appeal from courts and agency review
boards, tax cases, property takings cases under the Constitution, Indian rights cases,
personnel employment and benefits cases from the entire federal workforce and the
veterans administration, and a variety of administrative law issues, such as the vaccine
injury cases.
15. The backgrounds of the judges include work in private law practice, public
service, corporations, and academia in many areas of law, including litigation,
criminal law, intellectual property, tax, and labor law. See generally U.S. Court of
Appeals
for
the
Federal
Circuit
Judicial
Biographies,
http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). No subject matter
area, including patents, is represented in the backgrounds of a majority of the
judges.
16. See Plager, supra note 11, at 857-60.
17. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment
in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 800 (2004) (“Over all, observers largely
agree that in its twenty years of existence, the Federal Circuit has vastly improved the
patent system. But as with all experiments, there is always room for improvement.”);
Glynn S. Lunney, Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 76 (2004) (“[T]he Federal Circuit and its
doctrinal changes have brought less certainty and predictability to patent
enforcement.”); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction
More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 247 (2005) (“The [claim construction]
reversal rate ought to be going down, not up. The fault, at this point, undoubtedly
lies with the Federal Circuit itself.”); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L.
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Recent Supreme Court review of the Federal Circuit’s work
suggests the same heightened interest. As noted earlier, Supreme
Court review of an issue traditionally is keyed to conflict among the
circuit courts. Since the other circuit courts usually do not hear the
same kinds of cases as the Federal Circuit, the expectation was that
there would be few occasions for the Supreme Court to undertake a
review of this circuit’s work. That is not quite the case. In the years
of the court’s existence, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
18
it fifty-five times. Of these fifty-five, more than two-thirds were in
cases other than patent law, reflecting the fact that, though not all of
the court’s multi-varied subject matter areas have seen the same kind
of growth and emphasis as patent law, these other areas have also
grown and matured.
In the patent law area the Supreme Court’s recent interest has
manifested itself in two ways. One type of case that draws Supreme
Court attention is one in which the Circuit strays from generally
applicable rules governing litigation in favor of special rules for
patent cases. The Circuit has professed to want to bring its patent
jurisprudence into line with the rules applicable to federal civil
19
litigation generally, and in some respects has succeeded. When it
appears to the Supreme Court that the Circuit is creating special
rules that are unwarranted, the Court has intervened.
20
In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider when it is appropriate to issue a permanent
21
injunction in patent infringement cases. Following a jury verdict of
infringement against eBay, the district court had denied
22
The
MercExchange’s motion for permanent injunctive relief.
district court began by reciting the traditional four-factor test based
on equitable principles for determining when a permanent
23
injunction is appropriate. However, in applying the test, the court
considered that the test could not be satisfied by a patent owner who
does not practice its patents and exists merely to license its patented
REV. 1105, 1113 (2004) (“[W]hether the Federal Circuit is succeeding is a question
that remains remarkably open. . . . [Our findings] suggest[] that the court’s effort to
meet its mandate is both well underway and moving in the right direction.”).
18. See Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 10, at 822 (stating that certiorari has been
granted fifty-two times). The Court has granted certiorari in three additional cases
in the last year.
19. See, e.g., VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (applying the same venue rules to patent cases that apply to civil cases
generally).
20. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), vacating 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
21. Id. at 1839.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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24

technology to others. The Federal Circuit reversed, articulating a
“general rule,” unique to patent cases, “that a permanent injunction
25
will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.”
26
The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed. The Court held that
the traditional principles of equity that generally govern issuance of
injunctive relief “apply with equal force to disputes arising under the
27
Patent Act.” The Federal Circuit erred by departing from these
standards and applying a rule specific to patent cases.
Another recent case in which the Supreme Court stepped in to
bring the Circuit’s law into line with mainstream doctrine is
28
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. The issue in that case was whether
a patent licensee must terminate its license agreement with the
patentee before it can bring suit to obtain a declaratory judgment
29
that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.
The
district court determined there was no justiciable controversy and
30
dismissed MedImmune’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In so
doing, the court relied on a 2004 Federal Circuit decision which had
held that a patent licensee in good standing cannot establish an
Article III case or controversy with regard to the validity,
enforceability, or scope of the underlying patent because the license
agreement “obliterate[s] any reasonable apprehension” that the
31
licensee will be sued for infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed
32
the dismissal, also relying on its precedent.
The Supreme Court again disagreed, holding that a licensee is not
required to breach its license agreement before seeking a declaratory
judgment in federal court that the patent is invalid, unenforceable,
33
or not infringed.
The Court analogized the situation to one of
threatened action by the Government, in which a plaintiff is not
required to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to
34
challenge the threat.
The plaintiff may eliminate the threat of
prosecution by not doing what he claims the right to do, but his
failure to violate the law at issue does not eliminate Article III

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1840.
401 F.3d at 1338.
eBay, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
Id. at 1839.
127 S. Ct. 764 (2007), rev’g 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
See id.
Id. at 768.
See Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
427 F.3d at 962-63.
127 S. Ct. at 777.
Id.
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35

jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The Court
applied the same concept to cases of threatened enforcement action
by a private party, and thus a licensee’s failure to breach a license
agreement does not eliminate jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment
36
suit to challenge the patent.
Perhaps more curiously, though in keeping with the notion that
patent law now plays a major economic role in the nation, the
Supreme Court in several other recent cases has inserted itself into
the operational aspects of patent law. Since there are no circuit splits
requiring Supreme Court intervention into the substantive side of
patent law, the Court’s interest reflects a broader concern for the
functioning of the system. In his foreword to last year’s Federal
Circuit review, Judge Gajarsa discussed some of these cases, including
37
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., in which the Court
addressed the scope of the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) “safe harbor”
provision permitting the use of patented compounds in preclinical
38
studies.
He also discussed Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
39
40
Kabushiki Co., and Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,
in which the Court re-designed the rules for when prosecution
history estoppel bars patent infringement under the doctrine of
41
equivalents.
42
In Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,
a case involving whether a method claim for correlating medical test
results is patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in 2005 and heard argument in 2006, but then
43
dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Justice
Breyer, joined by two other justices, dissented from the dismissal,
stating that he would have decided the case and invalidated the
44
patent because it claimed an unpatentable “natural phenomenon.”
Thus at least some current members of the Court have expressed a
willingness to tackle the quintessential patent law issue of what
subject matter is entitled to patent protection.
The Supreme Court recently heard two more cases relating to
issues specific to patent law; neither has been decided as of this
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 772.
Id. at 772-73.
545 U.S. 193 (2005).
Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 10.
535 U.S. 722 (2002).
520 U.S. 17 (1997).
Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 10.
126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006).
See id.
Id. at 2927 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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writing. One case that has received considerable attention from the
bar and academia is KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., which
addresses the propriety of the Federal Circuit’s longstanding
“teaching-suggestion-motivation” test for obviousness under 35 U.S.C.
45
§ 103. The other is Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., in which the
Court will decide whether a golden master disk containing digital
software code that is made in the United States and shipped abroad
for replication and installation on foreign-assembled computers is a
“component” of a patented invention that is “supplied” from the
United States for purposes of infringement under 271 U.S.C.
46
§ 271(f).
Congress too has had occasion in recent time to consider the work
of the Federal Circuit. One area of interest has been the handling of
patent cases by the district courts. Because, as Judge Linn noted,
47
many of the district courts see patent cases only sporadically, a bill in
Congress proposes to establish a pilot program in select district
courts “to encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases
48
among district judges.” Five district courts from among the fifteen
with the most patent cases would be selected for the plan, under
which patent cases would be assigned only to those judges who
request to hear them. Whether such a program would alleviate some
of the problems now being experienced with regard to the circuit’s
review of district court claim construction matters would remain to be
49
seen.
Other areas of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence besides patent
law have also come to the attention of Congress. For example, recent
criticism of the court’s decisions in whistleblower cases on appeal
from the Merit System Protection Board is that the court has not
50
been sufficiently supportive of the whistleblowers. This is seen by
some not as a problem in the whistleblowing statute itself, but as a
problem in the court’s understanding of the statute. Advocates for
whistleblowers argue that the problem can only be corrected by
45. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (mem.).
46. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.).
47. Linn, supra note 5, at 736.
48. H.R. 34, 110th Cong. (2007).
49. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(several opinions dissenting from or concurring in the denial of petition for
rehearing en banc, urging that the Circuit reconsider its position on deference to
district court claim construction as set forth in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
50. House Votes to Expand Whistleblower Rights, Extend Protections to TSA Airport
Screeners, 75 U.S.L.W. 2559-60 (Mar. 20, 2007).
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providing whistleblowers with access to courts other than the Federal
Circuit when faced with adverse decisions from the Merit Systems
Protection Board. Partially in response to these complaints, Congress
introduced legislation to allow federal whistleblowers to bring an
action in district court if the Board does not act on their claims
within a certain period of time, and to appeal adverse Board or
district court decisions to the regional circuits as well as the Federal
51
Circuit.
III.
This brief overview of the current level of interest in the court and
its decisions, of which I have given only a limited sample, should be
seen as a positive. It demonstrates the value being placed on the
court’s work by the larger society, and the several mechanisms in
place for providing corrections when correction is needed. No court
involved in important work can expect to be immune from criticism;
indeed, typically every decision made by the court leaves at least half
the litigants unsatisfied, not to mention their supporters and others
who identify with them.
A danger to be avoided, however, is addressing specific complaints
with global solutions, especially when such solutions may have larger
consequences than the perceived problems. One example is the
effort to deal with whistleblower rights by restructuring the judicial
review process so as to allow forum shopping, rather than to correct
the problem by amendment to the requirements of the whistleblower
statute itself. Politically the former may be easier to accomplish than
the latter, but the latter is a way to address the real problem
complained of; the former is a fix that may or may not prove
efficacious and is likely to create even more problems.
Another example of the global approach fix to what are specific
concerns regarding specific issues is the proposal by two law
professors that patent cases no longer be decided only by the Federal
Circuit, but that jurisdiction reside in at least one other circuit as
52
well.
For a number of reasons, such a solution to perceived
problems with the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence falls short of
53
solving the problems alleged by the authors.
51. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985, 110th Cong.
§ 9 (2007).
52. Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle,
101 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
53. S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle:
A Response, 101 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
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This is not to say that the Federal Circuit itself bears no
responsibility for the complaints about it. There is always room for
improvement in any institution, and courts are no different.
Constructive suggestions are heard both from without the court and
from within. What the first twenty-five years has shown is that,
regardless of the inevitable growing pains of a new institution, this
“experiment” in judicial structuring has proven to be a significant
contribution to the country’s judicial system, vindicating its early
proponents’ hopes. There is little doubt that the court will meet the
challenges of the next twenty-five years with continued vigor and
resourcefulness, within the authorities provided by Congress and the
guidance as appropriate of the Supreme Court.

